TOP 10 REASONS WHY THE WALL IS THE DUMBEST POLICY IDEA EVER

Image source: CNN

AN OPINION PIECE

One of the most contentious issues in America right now is Donald Trump’s vision of a wall along the border with Mexico. It is his signature campaign pledge, the one he kicked off his race with and the theme he returned to most often over the long campaign. Accordingly, building a wall is one of, if not the, main reasons Trump’s supporters voted for him. That makes Republicans in Congress adamant about appropriating funding for it. Democrats are equally adamant about opposing it, however, since it stands against what they stand for. Like many political issues over the past decade in America, this has deadlocked Congress and provoked threats of shutting down the government rather than, you know, actually reaching a deal.

Normally, I hate this kind of brinkmanship and all-or-nothing politics, since all it does is energize the base while leaving urgent problems to fester. Ideally both sides should come together and work out some kind of compromise. However, I find it extremely hard to support that in this case, because the wall isn’t just some kind of flawed policy plan that could feasibly be watered down a bit and passed. It is, quite simply, the dumbest public policy idea I’ve ever heard of. To prove it, here are 10 reasons why.

1. Most Americans don’t even want it. It is important to remember any time Trump does something that makes your blood boil that he lost the popular vote. America uses a system called the Electoral College to choose its presidents; the number of its members is proportional to the population of America’s various states, but they usually vote in blocs for whichever candidate won their state. Trump actually only won 46% of the popular vote. This is hardly a convincing mandate for building a wall, but subsequent polls have shown a dearth of popular support as well. This poll found 57% against it; another one found 63% opposed. As for the states and counties along the border — you know, the ones who would be most affected by this —support is even more tepid. Support is strongest in states like Indiana and Alabama, which love Trump but have relatively few immigrants to stymie in the first place. Considering how big a project like building a wall is, drawing support from a minority of Americans — and a disproportionately old minority at that — is hardly a strong mandate.

2. Immigrants would still find a way in. They always do. Latino immigrants are fleeing desperate poverty and criminal violence; some are so pathetic they feel as if they have nothing to lose in attempting to cross. A wall may be harder to climb than a fence, but determined and well-organized immigrants could still do it. The plan for the wall may include a 6-foot-deep underground section, but immigrants could still tunnel 7 feet deep. (Drug smugglers have long managed to sneak their goods across the border this way.) Some immigrants are already making their way to Canada and crossing America’s other border. (Now there’s a border way too long for a wall.) Drug smugglers, in particular, are resourceful, and come up with devious ways to get around border security — everything from catapults, to wedging drugs in car bodies, to just going around the border by sea. If all else fails, they could always just punch a hole through the wall. The fence currently spanning the border incurred 9,287 breaches between 2010 and 2015. What makes you think a wall would be immune to this?

3. There aren’t even that many immigrants coming in. Trump’s rhetoric may be that dirty, dangerous Mexicans are flooding through the flimsy border, but in actuality there has been a sustained decline in Mexican immigration since 2001. A Pew Research Center report found that 870,000 Mexicans emigrated to America from 2009 to 2014 compared to 1.4 million from 2005 to 2010. This is due partly to the depression in America, partly to improved economic conditions in Mexico, partly to a slowing of the Mexican population growth rate, and partly to immigration enforcement in the US. Like much of Trump’s rhetoric, his descriptions are outdated. America does have a huge ethnic Mexican population, though, which might fuel these misperceptions. (It is also true that immigration from chaotic Central America has picked up.)

4. Immigrants have a beneficial effect on society. This is an important point in rational Democratic arguments, so I won’t go into it too much here, but suffice it to say that Americans should probably want immigrants. Desperate Mexicans are vital components of the American economy and fill the vast majority of low-paid agricultural, construction, restaurant, fishing and domestic jobs — the “dirty work” that whites rarely want to do. In America’s border states they are essential parts of local society. Despite Trump’s ranting about “bringing crime,” immigrants are actually more law-abiding than locals, and despite the perception that they are “taking jobs,” they actually help the economy, and therefore create jobs.

Image source: Brookings Institution

5. Actually building the wall would be a nightmare. Although vast tracts of the US-Mexican border are publicly owned desert, other parts are private property. What if the owners don’t want a wall built on their land? The US government could always negotiate to buy the land, but that would take years. 90 land rights lawsuits over building the border fence are still open from 2008. There are also environmental laws to consider. And what about the Rio Grande, which forms about half of the border? How would the wall work there? What about the mountains that dominate the Arizona-Sonora border? These sorts of logistical issues wouldn’t stymie the building entirely, but it would make it a long-term project that might outlast the lifespans of many Trump voters.

6. There are more innovative ways to secure the border. A wall is a very blunt, old-fashioned solution. For a country as innovative and forward-thinking as America, it’s not a very imaginative solution. Those actually involved in border security would rather opt for things like towers with radar, electro-optical and infrared cameras, aerial monitoring, and ground sensors that rely on AI or machine learning. Given the aforementioned difficulty in keeping out those determined enough to cross perilous distances with little loose money, it would be more practical and cost-effective to focus on detecting illegal border-crossers. Hiring more border security is usually lumped in with the wall in budget debates; it should really just replace the wall entirely.

7. It would ruin Mexican-American relations. Having a wall built on your border is one of the most in-your-face ways to be told “I don’t like you very much.” Trump may claim to be keeping out the “bad hombres,” but in reality he is playing on anti-Mexican sentiment, and Mexico gets it. As a result, Mexican-American relations have free-fallen since the election (really since Trump entered the race in 2015). Only 30% of Mexicans have a favorable opinion of the US, with 42% having a very unfavorable opinion. Anti-American feeling was instrumental in propelling Andrés Manuel Lôpez Obrador, a populist firebrand, to the presidency this year. As a general rule of thumb, it’s not a good idea to be on bad terms with your neighbors. In this specific case, good Mexican-American relations are important because the 2 countries’ economies are very interlinked thanks to NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) and immigration, and because America depends on Mexico for security cooperation. Trump acts like America is wasting money on Mexico, with its security aid, but what would happen if Mexico dropped its intelligence sharing with America? What if Mexico just stopped trying to detain migrants headed north, or looked the other way as drugs are smuggled up there? What if Mexico reneged on its water-sharing agreements and let American farmers wilt?

8. It would be a colossal waste of money. This should be pretty obvious, but walls are expensive. It is estimated that it could cost up to $25 billion. (Democratic estimates reach up to $70 billion, but of course those probably aren’t very accurate.) So much for shrinking the government. This would add to the tax cuts passed last year to further increase America’s budget deficit and basically asks future generations to foot the bill for the older generation’s xenophobia. Trump’s talk of seizing the remittances that Mexican immigrants send or of “making Mexico pay for it” is ridiculous.

9. It would have a chilling effect on immigration and tourism to America. A wall on the Mexican border would mainly affect Mexico and Central America, of course. But it would also send a strong signal that America no longer welcomes immigrants. This is apparent in some Trump voters’ fears that “terrorists” or “ISIS” are sneaking across the border. Even foreigners that reach America by plane would think twice before doing so. Trump’s rhetoric has already lowered the number of tourists, skilled immigrants, and students coming to America. These are important contributors to America’s economy and society. Imagine the harm that could be done if America actually built a wall.

10. It would besmirch what America stands for. As the most powerful argument, I save this for last. Americans get weepy and sentimental about their country being a beacon of hope and freedom. What that basically means is that it serves as a compelling destination for outsiders eager to make something of themselves, to try their luck in America’s dynamic, freewheeling, capitalist economy, and to flee oppression, stagnation and/or danger back home. That is the real symbolism of the Statue of Liberty (“Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free…”). America is hardly unique in welcoming immigrants from all over the world and moulding them into different people over many generations, but it is the most diverse and influential. Mexicans are not unique in contributing a great deal to American society. There has always been a strand of xenophobia and racism in American society, but by and large most Americans would agree that immigrants are a good thing. If America built a wall, it would no longer be able to claim some sort of moral superiority. It would no longer be able to gloat about bringing down the Soviet empire with its Berlin Wall. It would come to resemble a miserly, suspicious gated community that glares at brown passersby. Given the various impracticalities and stupidities associated with the wall, it should be fairly obvious that it’s meant to be a symbol — but of what? Of an America that sees the outside world as a threat?

So there you have it. The wall is not just dumb, it’s really, really dumb. I haven’t even gone into lesser reasons why it’s stupid, like its possible impact on animal migration patterns or how it would be hard to see what Mexicans might be doing on the other side. It’s so dumb, in fact, that I don’t think it should even be treated as a serious policy idea, but as a crackpot promise tossed out by an attention-hungry mogul looking to energize his political campaign without even considering it seriously. It speaks to how beholden the Republican party has become to deranged fanaticism that so many politicians are willing to treat this as a serious idea. Democrats, and sensible Americans in general, owe it to themselves to stand against such a dumbass idea no matter what.

SOFT POWER

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AN OPINION PIECE

We all know that countries aren’t really created equal. Yes, the principle of sovereignty, the practice of diplomacy, and the formats of most international institutions uphold the idea that countries are equal partners and that each one has an equal say in the running of the world. But it shouldn’t be too much of a controversy to state that some countries are more powerful than others. Even the UN recognizes this, with its Security Council that neatly aligns with the victorious powers of World War II.

What makes these countries more powerful than others? Their militaries, of course. Big armies and scary technology have been used throughout history to coerce weaker countries into doing what the strong country wants. When backed up by a smoothly functioning political system and bureaucracy, the power imbalance can be steep. Followers of the “realist” school of international relations say that this hard power is all that really matters: international relations is a contest for supremacy, and barring an unexpected event like a stupid political decision, the strong countries win and boss around everyone else.

This is basically true, but it would be inaccurate to just boil international relations down to that. (Otherwise, small, weak countries would have no chance.) Soft power plays a role as well. This concept, pioneered by the Harvard professor and former American defense official Joseph Nye, emphasizes other aspects of international power: culture, values and foreign policies. They may not make you tremble like nuclear weapons or aircraft carriers do, but subtly and over a long time, they are effective too.

“Liberals” and “constructivists,” the other factions in the academic world of international relations, have always emphasized the importance of values. If a country is seen as sharing your values, you’ll be more likely to ally with them or at least rely on them as a partner. If a country is not seen as sharing your values, the fear and suspicion that underlies much of diplomacy is only increased. Similarly, the way countries behave towards each other influences perceptions, even among bystander countries. A country with a track record of bullying, unpredictability and/or unreliability will find its diplomatic efforts stymied compared to one known for promoting peace, human rights and fair play.

I find culture to be the most fascinating aspect of this, since it’s such a slippery subject — hard to quantify, hard to evaluate, it’s usually overlooked or dismissed as a relevant factor in the cold hard world of international relations. But I think it subtly affects IR too. (This is one reason this blog occasionally covers cultural topics in addition to more newsworthy stuff.) For the most part, countries are drawn to those that share their culture, or have a similar one. History is littered with examples of alliances forged through shared cultural understanding: Imperial Germany’s interests may have lain with an alliance with powerful, influential Russia, but it ended up choosing Austria-Hungary mostly because of a shared Germanic culture and disdain for Russia’s Slavic culture. America and Britain may have important shared interests, but their alliance is cemented by a shared culture, language and history. The Commonwealth, Britain’s post-imperial club, mostly runs on these factors.

In the long run, the sense of a “superior” culture worth emulating accords certain countries a special status and deference from those who might be their equals or superiors politically. For most of ancient history, Greece was a mess politically speaking, but its sophisticated culture earned it a cachet from its neighbors and respect from its stronger adversaries, Persia and Rome. China commanded similar awe and emulation (although in that case it was helped by its size, strength, and resources). In general, religion is a particularly strong glue; the Arabs clashed numerous times with their neighbors, but the wide appeal of Islam and the prevalence of Arabic elevates them above their sometimes chaotic political situation.

The most subtle, underappreciated form of soft power might be plain and simple recognition. Let’s face it: not all countries are equally well-known, either. Guinea-Bissau is not as familiar as Mexico. Mozambique probably sounds like a made-up country to most of the world, but almost everyone has heard of China. Fame gives European countries in particular extra clout; Britain, France and Germany are among the most well-known countries in the world, and it’s very common for members of the global elite to at least visit them. Countries of similar size elsewhere, like the Congo, Iran or the Philippines, don’t get as much attention, which surely has an effect on the way they are treated.

When it comes to which country commands the most soft power, the question is hardly in dispute: America rules the roost. It may be proud of its enormous hard power, but soft power is the other tool in its arsenal. America’s political and economic systems are widely used models. It attracts lots of immigrants, increasingly from all over the world. Its universities are top-of-the-line. The globe is in thrall to American pop culture: look at how familiar American superheroes, American rappers, and American sitcoms are from the rich West to poor Africa. Thanks in part to the prevalence of English, even relatively mundane happenings in America attract international attention. It is true that American foreign policy doesn’t always command respect — George Bush’s cowboy attitude and dumb decision to invade Iraq made it rued around the world, and as Joseph Nye himself points out, America’s current president has done a lot to remind everyone of America’s negative qualities like vanity, ignorance and bullying bluntness. But it is famous, and its values and culture are broadly attractive.

The West in general commands a lot of soft power. Thanks to European imperialism, the world as a whole has been shaped in the Western image, and it would be nearly impossible to teach recent world history without discussing the West in some way. Europe is still the world’s biggest tourist draw. Its lingering historical prestige, combined with its present-day combination of cozy antique villages and a comfortable modern lifestyle sustained by generous welfare, go a long way in masking its long-term decline as an international player. Thanks in no small part to their colonialism, Britain and France are more familiar to many countries than their own neighborhoods. Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Canada have become immigrant magnets despite their light hard power credentials.

The other soft power titan? Japan. With a constitutional restriction on its hard power projection capability, Japan has pretty much banked on soft power to increase its clout. It has worked very well: Japanese technology is used all over the world, Japanese culture is among the most familiar outside of the West, tourism is booming, and Japanese characters from Pokemon to Gundam are the strongest rivals to America’s pantheon of pop culture icons. Although it is now a bit passe, in previous eras Japan was widely admired for modernizing rapidly along Western models while keeping its culture intact. While all this is important, Japan’s soft power is hobbled somewhat by various, mostly minor issues that regularly appear in the news (suicides, creepy fetishes, overwork, etc.), its hostility to immigrants and foreigners in general, and its terrible reputation among its immediate neighbors.

Probably the most discussed topic in soft power conversations these days — as in so many foreign policy discussions — is China. As mentioned earlier, China has historically been a soft power giant, exporting everything from philosophy to urban planning to its neighbors. But lately, its image has suffered somewhat, aside from die-hard Communists in the Maoist era. It is as often associated with rampant greed and bossing around its neighbors as it is with anything positive. For a long time, China didn’t really care, but beginning in the ’90s Nye’s theory started circulating in Chinese intellectual circles. Eager as always to compete with America and cultivate an image as a peaceful power, China has begun to aggressively promote its soft power. Confucius Institutes all over the world teach Chinese language and handicrafts; Chinese cultural performances are heavily marketed; the Chinese New Year is celebrated overseas; even Confucius (Master Kong), once demonized by the Communists, has been rehabilitated and rebranded as an icon of a gentle, wise China.

These campaigns are only a little over a decade old, so their efficacy is probably too soon to judge. Whatever their merits, China already has a great deal of soft power on account of its fame and attributes like dim sum, taiji, and Jackie Chan. But China’s efforts seem doomed to fail, or at least disappoint, for 2 reasons: 1, they’re state-led, while the vibrancy and appeal of, say, Japan’s pop culture is organic; and 2, it is unclear whether an appreciation for a country’s culture will necessarily lead to an endorsement of that country’s values and foreign policy — which is the point of all of this. Plenty of people enjoy The Big Bang Theory and KFC while railing about American imperialism.

Other countries also wield outsized clout thanks to their soft power. South Korea’s movies, pop groups and TV dramas have won it many fans throughout Asia. India’s movies, religious practices, and — to a lesser extent — music have gone a long way in giving it a more benign image than China and ameliorating negative impressions of India abroad. Even countries like Nigerian and Turkey, who are more often thought of as places to emigrate from, have acquired a bit of a “cool” status thanks to their pop cultures and vibrant societies. These countries would do well to encourage their creative industries to cash in on their burgeoning cachets.

So what, say the realists. Why does any of this matter? At the end of the day, it’s hard power — military might, diplomatic skill, and cold, hard cash — that settles things. Why does it matter that Russia (for example) has a dearth of soft power? If it wants to, it can step in and smoosh its neighbors. Would a fondness for French wine make one less willing to resist a French invasion? Would cute Japanese mascot characters make one more likely to surrender in a trade dispute?

Probably not. Hard power continues to be the most important element of international relations. But I think that in the day-to-day conduct of international affairs, when countries aren’t always at each other’s throats, soft power does play an important role. What academics call “normative biases” do affect thinking and decision-making. Even if governments use a more rational calculus of their interests, their citizens are affected by soft power, and governments usually reflect the popular will. American pop culture saturation makes it hard to conceive of the Philippines actually breaking its alliance with the US. Peaceful images like meditating sadhus and damsels warbling love songs make it hard for anyone but Pakistanis to think of India as a truculent power. Cultural and media exposure have created a bond between North America, South Korea, Japan and Europe that does much to reinforce their formal alliances. And frankly, soft power makes it more likely for people to care about other countries. Sometimes, simple awareness makes a lot of difference.

NOTE: There seems to be some disagreement whether economic power counts as “hard” or “soft.” On one hand, money is definitely powerful, and a state of economic dependence can be as crippling as military occupation. On the other hand, “hardness” is often equated with force or the threat of using force, while money is seen as a way to persuade rather than coerce. The best answer seems to be that it depends on how economic power is used, as this article argues.

COPING WITH CHINA

Image source: Financial Times

AN OPINION PIECE

China has prompted a great deal of hand-wringing and anxiety in the rest of the world for centuries, thanks to its massive population and alien culture. Napoleon deemed it a “sleeping giant” and urged Westerners to let it be. Chinese immigration to the West later in the 1800s produced the notion of a vague “Yellow Peril” that would swamp and ruin the West somehow. This merged in the 1900s with the “Red Peril” of Communism when Communists took over China. Southeast Asians have long had an uneasy and mostly unhappy relationship with China, and Chinese immigrant communities there haven’t always integrated well, even centuries later. Japan’s invasions and subjugation of China were partly intended to suppress its economic and military potential. All kinds of little things, from the air of superiority Chinese maintained even under foreign occupation to the bluntness and constant tone shifts of Chinese, have reinforced the idea of China as a threat.

And yet, China has also held an allure at the same time. Mostly, this is economic: it has always been the world’s biggest market, and combined with its well-organized administration and its people’s business acumen and entrepreneurial spirit, this has made it almost irresistible for foreign businessmen. Partly, it’s sentimental: there is genuine admiration for a culture that built the Great Wall, administered a merit-based civil service, and invented mapo doufu. Richard Nixon asked his ambassador to Taiwan to “just stop and think of what could happen if anybody with a decent system of government got control of that main land [China]… you put 800 million Chinese to work under a decent system and they will be the leaders of the world.” Naturally, this is part of what led him to “open up” China to the outside world in 1972; he wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1967 that “we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors…. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.”

China’s relationship with the outside world has thus been defined by simultaneous anxiety and hope, as my series on its foreign relations has shown. But lately, especially since Xi Jinping took over as China’s dictator in 2012, foreign feelings on China have leaned noticeably toward anxiety. Partly, this is because of the international climate: America and Britain are in disarray over their own stupid political decisions, the EU is struggling to stay united and harmonious, Russia has gone rogue and rising powers like Brazil and India are still mostly preoccupied with their own development and their immediate neighborhoods. It has provided an environment ripe for Chinese influence.

But China has done its part to appear as a threat. It is relentlessly authoritarian, maybe even totalitarian: since Xi took power, surveillance and censorship have tightened, the grounds for jailing political dissidents have widened, and any mass movement is controlled and monitored by the Party or shut down. To the alarm of freedom-lovers everywhere, Xi discarded term limits last month, completing a process of consolidating his own position as China’s unchallenged dictator. After the Beijing Olympics and global financial crisis in 2008, China went through a period of smugness and assertiveness overseas; even though this mostly amounted to backing up its friend, North Korea, at the UN when it torpedoed a South Korean ship and more aggressive defense of its territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, it was clear to many foreigners that China felt confident in its new wealth and strength and increasingly willing to make itself felt on the international stage.

Xi has pushed China toward a more expansive role abroad too. Some international security analysts see China as trying to make itself the regional hegemon of East Asia and ultimately shove America out of the region; whether or not that’s true, it has militarized the South China Sea, made vague threats against Taiwan, provoked a border stand-off with India, bickered with Japan over the Senkaku Islands and Japan’s attempt to beef up its military, and bullied South Korea with a boycott. It has propped up the North Korean dictatorship in the face of international sanctions and implicitly encourages human rights abuses in countries like Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Sudan through its no-strings-attached support. Laos and Cambodia have become Chinese satellites thanks to the amount of Chinese investment there; the “Belt and Road Initiative” envisions Chinese infrastructure linking China with Europe, and has already led to massive Chinese investments and construction in the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. At his big speech to the Party Congress last year, Xi spent a lot of time bragging about China’s development model and encouraged other countries to adopt it.

At the moment, trade is the biggest bone of contention. Salivation over China’s giant, juicy market recommenced pretty quickly after Deng Xiaoping’s opening of the Chinese economy in the late ’70s. Beyond appeasing drooling businessmen, governments had political justifications for trading with China: more trade with the outside world meant more interaction with it, which would mean subordination to more powerful countries and exposure to their superior models of government and economics. Japan’s experience after World War II was the model: it grew back into a Great Power and seemed like it would grow into an economic superpower. It delivered prosperity to its people without being an imperialist scourge and developed cool cars and technology the whole world used. The similar development stories of the “Asian Tigers” (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) and the rapid collapse of the Communist Bloc after Mikhail Gorbachyov loosened political controls in the ’80s seemed to justify the strategy even more.

Although history hasn’t somehow ended, so far it seems that foreign expectations were wrong. Yes, China has become an economic powerhouse, the primary source of low-end manufacturing and the second-biggest consumer market (it’s still not as rich as America). Yes, China is now much more open than before and exports students and tourists more than any other country. But it’s come at a cost to foreign business. The Party has been careful to protect its state-owned enterprises and keep huge sectors of the Chinese economy under their control. Foreigners may have been willing to share their technological expertise with China when it was a struggling rival to the Soviet Union, but it is now a competitor to the West and outright steals intellectual property from foreign businesses, either through joint ventures in the country or by hacking overseas. There are export restraints and health-and-safety measures that stifle agricultural imports. Technology is the most valuable sector now, but the Giants of Silicon Valley are barred from the Chinese market. Meanwhile, the West’s manufacturing sector has been gutted.

China’s economic expansion has awakened fears of a new wave of imperialism from an unfamiliar source. Chinese demand is instrumental in keeping Latino economies afloat. China is now the largest player in Africa and builds everything from roads and railways to soccer stadiums and palaces. Sri Lanka is deep in debt thanks to a Chinese-built port it couldn’t quite afford. Myanmar reconciled with the West due to fears that it was becoming a Chinese satellite. The Philippines dropped its objections to Chinese naval activity in its waters in the hopes of attracting Chinese investment. Even Western places like the Balkans and Australia are being reshaped by Chinese intervention.

Pundits on China have always been split into hawks who fear China and urge toughness and suspicion and doves who are enamored with it and downplay the problems. These days the hawks are ascendant. China-bashing wins votes in America and Japan and popular support in Vietnam. America is hitting China with tariffs, threats and patrols in the South China Sea; Australia is undergoing a sweep of politicians under Chinese influence. Murmurs about World War III are becoming regular. Talk of China democratizing or even loosening up has basically died out. The businessmen and consultants who have traditionally urged for a cozy relationship with China have become gloomy and pessimistic.

But I believe that Nixon’s logic still holds. China is simply too powerful, important and large to ignore or shun. The genie can’t be put back in the bottle; the giant can’t be put back to sleep. The world has to cope. Relentlessly bashing China or trying to isolate it would be unwise or even disastrous. It is a proud, prickly country with a strong sense of entitlement and nationalism. Past humiliations have made it ultra-sensitive to anything resembling mistreatment. As the linchpin of East Asia, a war with it would devastate arguably the world’s most important region, set back decades of economic progress and raise unpleasant possibilities like a mass cyberattack or nuclear pulverization.

Besides, China still has much to offer the world. For all their misgivings and anxieties, developing countries mostly look up to China. The West probably doesn’t appreciate how well its development model has worked. Impoverished African countries, long overlooked by the West and Japan for their human rights abuses, are attracting desperately needed investment that for the most part actually helps. If it lives up to the hype, the Belt and Road Initiative could actually help bind Asia, the world’s biggest continent, together and encourage more trade and transit between its countries. In recent years China has pioneered technological innovation and is pouring investment into R&D in burgeoning fields like renewable energy and artificial intelligence. Even with all the hassles, its consumer market is still enormous. And expecting the Party to pursue policies that would weaken its own hold on power is a little unrealistic.

That being said, I wouldn’t classify myself as a China “dove” either. Chinese leaders tend to have an unsentimental view of the world and will continue pushing if external forces are pliant enough. They have already changed their tune in the past decade: while in the ’00s they emphasized China’s peaceful rise and its lack of interest in interfering overseas, they are now cockier, more involved and openly ambitious. China’s so-called “sharp power” (its increasing ability to pressure foreigners peacefully but aggressively) is worrying and could get sharper. Foreign leaders, especially in the West, will have to stand up for their own principles and make sure the Chinese stand by theirs. Shenanigans like China’s trade violations that rankle a lot of countries would make good opportunities for united fronts like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (a pan-Pacific grouping of East Asian, Oceanian and American countries focused on lowering trade barriers). Bullying over issues like the Dalai Lama and Taiwan should be resisted. During the Cold War, the “containment” policy of limiting Soviet influence ultimately worked; although outright containment would be inappropriate for a country as integral as China, America, Japan, India, Vietnam, the EU and Australia would do well to coordinate efforts to counter its influence and offer small countries alternatives.

I am not altogether hopeful that this strategy will be adopted. Great Powers don’t like to cede influence willingly, and there will have to be voluntary cession of power and influence to accommodate China peacefully. “Accommodate China while remaining firm on our core interests” isn’t going to pump voters up. Non-Western countries are too diverse and conflicted about China for the West to ally with without a lot of friction, and it might be too much. But navigating a middle course between caving in and lashing out is the most prudent way for the world to cope with China. Look at East Asia, which has the most experience with it: countries like South Korea and Singapore have been careful to be friendly with China without alienating America or ceding their sovereignty. Even Vietnam, traditionally very suspicious of its neighbor, has been careful not to be too confrontational. The world would do well to listen to Master Kong, who declared that “the superior man cultivates a friendly harmony without being weak.”